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ABSTRACT 
This study draws on information theory and aims to provide simulated evidence using real historical 
and statistical data to demonstrate how various levels of integration moderate the impact and 
uncertainties of information security breach on supply chain performance. We find that the supply 
chain behaves differently under various levels of integration when a security breach occurs. The 
entropy analysis revealed that the wholesaler experience the most uncertainty under system failure 
and data corruption.  This sort of impact-uncertainty information will aid in designing and managing a 
resilient supply chain poised for minimal breach impact. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The prevalence of this information sharing paradigm is so rampant that many organisations now 
cannot do without it. Any compromise to the flow of this vital information would have drastic effect 
on business performance. Therefore businesses and even supply chains have realised the need to 
protect this information, even so a significant number have not done enough to protect the 
Information Systems (IS) that carries this information (Potter and Beard, 2010). With the growing 
level of sophistication with which miscreants attack various IS, one cannot ignore the issue of IS 
security. In order to plan for a formidable security strategy, the impact of IS security on supply chain 
operations must be well understood. Knowing the impact of security breach on an organization and 
how this affects other members co-owning or depending on the IS would appear to be the requisite 
foundation to any sustainable information security policy. An information systems security breach for 
the most part introduces uncertainties or chaos into supply chain operations. Therefore while it is 
important to understand the cost impact of these breaches, it is more so imperative to establish which 
aspects of operation or areas in the supply chain are most vulnerable to attack. This will particularly 
help the supply chain prioritize ‘what?’ and ‘where?’ along the supply chain require intensified 
protection and what appropriate mitigation solution should be adopted. This way, the supply chain can 
effectively and efficiently plan its operations, optimally prepared for any eventualities. It seems 
intuitive that impact of security breach and the uncertainties introduced by such breaches on supply 
chain members would vary depending on the extent of IS dependence. However this has not been 
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evidenced in literature. The extent of IS dependence is conceptualised as the level of information 
sharing (also called information integration) in the supply chain.  
This study applies discrete event simulation (DES) to investigate the impact information security 
breach has on supply chain performance under various information sharing scenarios. We then use the 
concept of entropy theory to analyse the degree of uncertainty a breach introduces to the supply chain 
and its members and how this affects supply chain performance. The performances being assessed are 
supply chain cost which includes the inventory holding cost, backlog cost and ordering cost, and do 
not include cost associated with damage to company’s image or regulatory fines. This paper is 
organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of relevant literature. In Section 3, the 
simulation experiment models are described. Section 4 summarizes the result and discussion and 
Section 5 concludes the study.  
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 The role of information sharing 
As some have suggested that the world is currently in the information age and consequently business 
should be conducted with this is mind. A business would thrive if it can position itself to leverage as 
much relevant information as possible. Communication between businesses has greatly improved over 
the years with the use of Information Systems (IS) such as Inter-organizational Information Systems 
(IOIS) and huge efforts have been invested into communication with customers as well. Fuelling this 
agenda is the plethora of investigations into the benefits of communication and information sharing 
that can be found in literature (Chan and Chan, 2009; Li et al., 2006; Zhou and Benton Jr, 2007).  
Li et al. (2006) surmised  that the advantage of using IOIS does not only come from efficient 
transaction processing and improved monitoring and information processing capacity as previous 
studies indicate, but also from sharing and improved access to key business information. Such key 
business information have been reported to be demand, inventory, supply lead time and capacity 
information (Kulp et al., 2004; Yu et al., 2010) and a few others. Huang et al. (2003) revealed in 
quantitative terms that sharing demand, inventory, and lead time information hold varied benefits 
depending on the level of information sharing. At the same time, several studies in literature have also 
shown that the derived benefits only come under the right conditions of: right information being 
shared at the right time in the right format by the right entities within the right environment (Chan and 
Chan, 2009). Since security breach in effect would compromise the right conditions of information 
sharing it therefore appears intuitive that the level of information sharing would affect how an 
incidence of security breach impact the supply chain and its members. An indication of this has been 
given by Durowoju et al. (2012b) but this has not been validated. This study aims to validate this and 
show very clearly in quantitative terms how this happens. 
There have been many studies looking at IS risks to an organization and a very few have studied 
IS risk to the supply chain. However there is yet to be an academic study on the impact of IS 
disruptions on the supply chain under various conditions. The supply chain condition is defined here 
as the state of the chain in terms of the level of information sharing (information integration) present, 
the specific ordering option being used and the structure of the supply chain. It is not evident from 
literature how this condition mitigates or worsens these risks.  
2.2 Entropy assessment of IS risk 
While previous studies have estimated information security risks as a function of threat occurrence 
and the associated financial loss (Rees et al., 2011), only a few have employed the Entropy theory. 
Although the concept of using entropy as an approach to determine uncertainty has been used in 
literature by (Frizelle, 2002; Frizelle and Woodcock, 1995; Martínez-Olvera, 2008; Sivadasan et al., 
2002), the closest previous studies have come to applying entropy as an assessment tool in security 
studies has been in data privacy studies such as disclosure risk assessment (Airoldi et al., 2011), 
measuring anonymity (Bezzi, 2007; Deng et al., 2007). The argument is that since complexity of a 
system (characterized by the uncertainty of a system) can be measured using entropy approach 
(Frizelle and Woodcock, 1995; Martínez-Olvera, 2008), and, the little is known about a random 
variable the more the entropy of that variable, hence the level of entropy of a security breach can be 
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determined once the probability of occurrence is known (Airoldi et al., 2011). The approach is to 
evaluate security threats using threat occurrence to work out the level of entropy each threat 
introduces into the system.  This will help identify those threats that are hot spots to guide 
management decision in selecting appropriate countermeasures and mitigation solutions. While this 
study is not an optimality study, it provides a useful methodology to security risk assessment from a 
process based view where financial loss information is not known a priori. Frizelle and Efstathiou 
(2002) explained that high entropy can impede flow by introducing obstacles that makes supply chain 
operations less predictable. By inference, security breaches introduce obstacles to the flow of 
operation and the predictability of these breaches can help evaluate the level of chaos they introduce 
into the system. Airoldi et al. (2011) demonstrated that using entropy approach in estimating risk is 
very effective. The mathematical definition of entropy as prescribed by Shannon (1948) is a 
quantitative measure of uncertainty (Martínez-Olvera, 2008; Sivadasan et al., 2002): 
 
H(S) is the entropy level of the system, defined here as the expected amount of information needed to 
describe the state of the system S , and Pi is the probability of breach i (i=1,....,n) occurring, where 
Pi 0 
Sivadasan et al. (2002) proposed two models for determining operational complexity under two 
conditions. First is complexity associated with knowing whether the system is “in control” or “not in 
control” denoted by the “in or not in control operational complexity index,” OCI (SINC) as shown in 
equation (2), where P is the probability of being in control. OCI (SINC) is a measure of the amount of 
information needed to describe the “in-control” or “not in control” state of the system. The closer the 
probability of incidence is to 0.5, the closer the OCI (SINC) value is to one. 
 
Second is the complexity associated with out-of-control states, given that the system is not in 
control i.e. a breach has occurred. This is denoted by the “not in control operational complexity 
index,” OCI (SNC) shown in equation (3), where Pi/j is the conditional probability computed over the 
“not in control” state with states i (i=1,..., n) at nodes j (j=1,..., M). This index is a measure of the 
amount of information needed to monitor the extent to which the system is not in control. 
 
According to Sivadasan et al. (2002), the sum of equation (2) and (3) is the total operational 
complexity denoted by the operational complexity index, OCI (Stotal).  It follows that the higher the 
operational complexity index, the higher the entropy introduced by the breach into the system and 
hence the more the associated information needed to manage the system and vice versa. 
3 THE SIMULATION MODEL 
To illustrate the impact of a security breach, we use the latest information on system failure and data 
corruption (SFDC) and attack on website or internet gateway (AOW) extracted from the 2012 
Information Security Breach Survey (Potter and Beard, 2010). The survey was an online self-select 
survey with 447 respondent organizations. The respondents were security professionals. We were able 
to extract information on the average service disruption period caused by the breaches as well as the 
frequency of occurrence. This information was incorporated into our simulation model as a 
deterministic model. SFDC was characterised as a breach with average disruption period of five days 
with an average of three occurrences per year. According to the survey, the average disruption period 
for AOW was one day with an average occurrence of fifty four times a year. We use these two 
breaches to illustrate our concept.   
The sequence of activities for this study is similar to the one described in (Durowoju et al., 
2012b). We would refer the reader to this article for a more comprehensive detail. Information 
integration is modeled in this study as sharing real time demand, inventory and lead time information. 
We considered four scenarios of integration, one between retailer and wholesaler only (RW); that 
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between wholesaler and manufacturer only (WM); and one between all three (RWM). The fourth 
mode is the basic chain with no information being shared (BC) and it is the base mode against which 
all other integration levels will be evaluated. However we have improved the reliability of the 
previous study to 98% confidence level. The entropy scores are calculated using the steps described in 
(Durowoju et al., 2012a). However we have used quantity instead of cost in our evaluation of 
uncertainty. 
4 RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
4.1     Impact of breach 
An ANOVA test (p<0.05) revealed that integration mitigates the impact of both SFDC and AOW on 
supply chain operating cost. Figure 1 shows that SFDC had greater impact than AOW for all 
information sharing scenarios. The Paired-t test (p<0.05) revealed that there was significant difference 
in the impact of SFDC between all integration modes. The RWM mode experiences the highest like-
for-like increase in cost (27%) while the BC mode enjoys the least increase (at 20%) when faced with 
SFDC breach type. This seems intuitive as the more the supply chain depends on information, the 
higher the disruption caused when this information becomes suddenly unavailable. However we see 
that this does not hold true under AOW breach type.  This is because the average service disruption 
for AOW is one day, which is less than the lead time between the retailer and the wholesaler (2days). 
Consequently the impact of the disruption is minimised and the effect of higher level of integration 
lessened. Therefore there is no significant difference between the impact of AOW on a chain with no 
form of integration (BC) and that with integration between the wholesaler and the manufacturer only 
(WM). There is also no difference between WM and RWM under AOW breach. This shows that RW 
(at 2% impact) absorbs the impact of AOW significantly more than any other information sharing 
scenario. In the case of SFDC breach however, the impact was highest for the full integration mode 
(RWM). 
 
Figure 1: Impact of both security breach on supply chain operating cost 
4.2    Relative effect of integration 
Using the BC mode as the base mode we consider the relative effect of RW, WM and RWM. This is 
shown in Table 2. We find that the WM mode performs 4% better than the non-integrated chain and 
the other integrated chains while the RW chain performed the same as the BC mode under SFDC 
breach. However under AOW, the RWM mode absorbs 8% of the impact on the BC mode (which is 
significantly greater than WM and RW at p<0.05), while both WM and RW absorb 6% each of the 
impact on BC. We see that the mitigating effect of integration varies depending on the breach in 
question. It is therefore important to profile these breaches and see how they are mitigated by the 
supply chain condition.  
Table 2: Mitigating role of integration on security breach impact 
 Effect of Integration 
Breach Type BC ($) WM RW RWM 
SFDD 360 4% 0% 2% 
AOW 313 6% 6% 8% 
4.3     Entropy assessment 
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The SINC is the uncertainty associated with not knowing whether there would be a negative impact or 
not, that is the 50/50 chance of a negative impact. The closer the probability of in-control (i.e. no 
negative impact observed) is to 50%, the closer SINC is to 1. Also the further the probability of in-
control is from 50% either increasing or decreasing, the closer SINC is to 0. Hence the lower the 
SINC score the more certain you are of either experiencing a negative impact or not, the higher the 
score the less certain you are. The SNC on the other hand is the uncertainty associated with the 
number of countable states of the impact when it is negative. Higher scores occur when the impact is 
spread over several countable states, and lesser scores occur over few countable states. Consequently 
the higher the probability of experiencing a negative impact over just one single state or none at all, 
the closer SNC is to 0. SINC cannot exceed 1 in this case and SNC can exceed 1 depending on the 
spread of impact. 
We see from Table 3 how the uncertainty changes for the performance of the supply chain agents 
depending on the level of integration when SFDC occurs. The table shows that there is no uncertainty 
in the way SFDC impacts the order quantity for all agents across all integration modes. However for 
the retailer we see that the uncertainty experienced is due to that associated with Backlog performance 
only and that RWM reduces this uncertainty from 0.5 in BC to 0.15. The implication is that full 
integration helps reduce the chaos introduced by SFDC on retailer backlog performance, while WM 
increases the uncertainty from 0.5 to 0.68. A further inspection indicates that this uncertainty is only 
due to SINC uncertainty. The incentive is for the retailer to be fully integrated with the wholesaler and 
the manufacturer. 
For the wholesaler, uncertainty experienced in On-hand inventory performance is only due to 
SNC and that experience in backlog performance is due to SINC. However, we see that the RW 
partial integration and RWM full integration reduces the uncertainty associated with on hand 
inventory performance from 0.43 to zero. However WM only makes this uncertainty worse. The same 
trend is observed regarding the backlog performance, however the WM mode only made it marginally 
better instead of worse. This implies that RW and RWM would reduce the uncertainties introduced by 
the incidence of SFDC for the wholesaler. Therefore the incentive here might be to always integrate 
with the retailer and not the manufacturer only. 
The influence of integration was rather different for the manufacturer. Under the on-hand 
inventory performance, the uncertainty brought about by SFDC was increased in the RWM scenario 
while decreased to zero in the RW and RWM scenarios. A similar trend is observed under the backlog 
performance. RWM worsens the uncertainty and WM reduces the uncertainty. Therefore the incentive 
for the manufacturer is to integrate with the wholesaler only. 
Overall we see that the wholesaler experience the highest level of uncertainty under the BC mode 
(1.43) and the WM mode (1.55). The retailer experienced the least uncertainty especially under the 
RWM mode (0.15) the manufacturer consistently experienced more uncertainty than the retailer over 
all forms of integration. 
Table 3: Entropy assessment of SFDC 
   RETAILER WHOLESALER MANUFACTURER 
   Order quantity  Order quantity Order quantity 
  BC RW WM RWM BC RW WM RWM BC RW WM RWM 
SINC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SNC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
TE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
   On-Hand Inventory On-Hand Inventory  On-Hand Inventory 
  BC RW WM RWM BC RW WM RWM BC RW WM RWM 
SINC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SNC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 
TE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.57 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.26 
   Backlog Quantity Backlog Quantity Backlog Quantity 
  BC RW WM RWM BC RW WM RWM BC RW WM RWM 
SINC 0.50 0.57 0.68 0.15 1.00 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.80 0.97 0.72 1.00 
SNC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
TE 0.50 0.57 0.68 0.15 1.00 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.80 0.97 0.72 1.00 
Total 0.50 0.57 0.68 0.15 1.43 0.00 1.55 0.00 0.95 0.97 0.72 1.26 
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4 CONCLUSION 
We have only tried to show that integration mitigates the impact of security breach and demonstrate 
how these breaches introduce uncertainties in the performance of supply chain agents. We have 
shown that the impact of a breach varies depending on the type of breach and the level of integration. 
While it is important to understand cost impact, the uncertainties associated with this impact is also 
important to keep in mind. Depending on the state of the supply chain this impact can vary depending 
on the severity of the disruption caused by the breach and entropy theory has been applied to 
understand where the vulnerabilities lie. Future work would be to complete the entropy assessment of 
the other breach types and also investigate the role of ordering policy in mitigating the impact and 
uncertainty of these breaches. 
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